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ABSTRACT To communicate effectively in policymaking systems, actors need to under-
stand how policymakers process evidence and the environment in which they operate.
Therefore, we combine psychology and policy studies to produce a three-step strategy. First,
do not bombard people with evidence. Human beings have too much information to process,
and they use heuristics to ﬁlter information to make decisions quickly. Synthesise and frame
evidence to help you tailor it to the ways in which policymakers demand and understand
information. Second, ﬁnd the right time to act. Timing matters during key individuals’ patterns
of thinking and the alignment of conditions in political systems. Third, engage with real world
policymaking rather than waiting for a ‘rational’ and orderly process to appear. To present evi-
dence during mythical stages of a ‘policy cycle’ is misguided, and to ‘speak truth to power’
without establishing legitimacy and building trust may be counterproductive. Our overall
message is pragmatic, not Machiavellian: effective communication requires the suppliers of
evidence to see the world from the perspective of their audience and understand the policy
process in which they engage.
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Introduction: use psychology and policy theory to improve
communication
Policymakers cannot pay attention to all the things for whichthey are responsible, or process all of the information theycould use to make decisions. Like all people, there are limits
on what information they can process (Baddeley, 2003; Cowan,
2001, 2010; Miller, 1956; Rock, 2008). People use short cuts to
gather enough information to make decisions quickly: the
‘rational’, by pursuing clear goals and prioritising certain kinds of
information, and the ‘irrational’, by drawing on emotions, gut
feelings, values, beliefs, habits, and the familiar, to make decisions
quickly.
We use the term ‘irrational’ provocatively, to criticise an often-
expressed sense that ‘fast thinking’ hinders the use of evidence in
policy: the fairytale that heroic scientists are thwarted by villai-
nous politicians drawing on their emotions and deeply held
beliefs in a ‘post truth’ world (see Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017).
Rather, policymakers face unusually strong and constant pres-
sures on their cognition and emotion. They need to gather
information quickly and effectively, often in highly charged
political atmospheres, so they develop heuristics to allow them to
make what they believe to be good choices. Perhaps their
solutions seem to be driven more by their values and emotions
than a ‘rational’ analysis of the evidence, often because we
hold them to an information processing standard that no human
being can reach. If so, and if they have high conﬁdence in their
heuristics, they may dismiss criticism of their decision-making
process as biased and naïve. Under those circumstances, repeat-
edly stating the need for ‘rational’ and ‘evidence-based policy-
making’ is pointless, and naively ‘speaking truth to power’
counterproductive.
Our alternative approach is to develop ways to engage posi-
tively while recognising that the limits to evidence-based action
and cognitive biases we ascribe to policymakers are also present
in ourselves, our own groups, and the people we often describe as
experts (Perez, 2015; Cassidy and Buede, 2009).1 Rather than
decry cognitive biases in one’s political opponents, it is more
helpful to acknowledge their universal existence (Houghton,
2008). It can be deeply counterproductive to use unpleasant
euphemistic terms like ‘low information’ to describe actors whose
views we do not respect. This is a particular problem for scholars
if they assume that most people do not live up to their own
imagined standards of high-information-led action while actually
using similar shortcuts to reinforce and bolster their own beliefs
(Gregg et al., 2016).
Instead, we synthesise a wealth of knowledge from studies of
psychology and policy theory to produce a more effective three-
step communication strategy:
1. Understand your audience. To help tailor your approach to
the cognitive processes present in human beings, synthesise
evidence concisely to minimise its cognitive burden, and
‘frame’ your conclusions rather than expecting evidence to
speak for itself.
2. Identify the right time to exploit ‘windows of opportunity’.
‘Timing’ can refer to the right time to inﬂuence an individual,
depending on their current way of thinking, or to act while
the political conditions are just right.
3. Engage with real world policymaking rather than waiting for a
‘rational’ and orderly process to appear. To present evidence
during mythical stages of a ‘policy cycle’ may be misguided,
and to ‘speak truth to power’ without establishing trust in
networks and an open culture in organisations may be
counterproductive.
These steps are complementary and interconnected rather than
a suite of options from which to choose one. They help produce
pragmatic, not manipulative, communicators. We do not argue
that policymakers have unusual cognitive biases or that we should
use psychological insights or bend evidence to trick politicians.
Rather, these steps help foster the clearer communication of
policy-relevant evidence to any relevant audience. Further, it is
useful to work on the assumption that people’s beliefs are hon-
estly held, and policymakers believe that their role is to serve a
cause greater than themselves. Indeed, we often elect politicians
so that they can use their values to make difﬁcult moral
choices on our collective behalf. Or, someone seeking to encou-
rage more powerful people to change course may need to run
alongside them, in the same direction, at least for a while,
before pointing out that better paths exist. This involves showing
simple respect and seeking ways to secure their trust, rather than
feeling egotistically pleased about ‘speaking truth to power’
without discernible progress. Effective engagement requires pre-
paration, diplomacy, and good judgement as much as good
evidence.
Key insights from psychology and policy theory
For decades, policy theories have used the phrase ‘bounded
rationality’ to describe the limits to our cognitive power: as
human beings, policymakers do not have the time, resources or
cognitive capacity to consider all information, all possibilities, all
solutions, or anticipate all the consequences of their actions
(Simon, 1976; Cairney and Heikkila, 2014). People are ‘cognitive
misers’ (Kam, 2005), using informational shortcuts and heuristics
to gather just enough information to make decisions.
More recently, policy scholars have drawn heavily from psy-
chology to understand how emotions act as informational
shortcuts, and coexist with cognition in individual and group
thinking. Direct reference points from psychology include:
1. Haidt’s (2001, p 818; 2007, 2012) distinction between
‘intuitive system’ and ‘reasoning system’. People grasp moral
truths as a form of perception, not reﬂection, and ‘moral
reasoning is usually an ex post facto process used to inﬂuence
the intuitions (and hence judgements) of other people’; one
has an instant gut response to certain issues and ‘when faced
with a social demand for a verbal justiﬁcation, one becomes a
lawyer trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for
the truth’ (Haidt, 2001, p 814).
2. Kahneman’s (2012, p 20) thinking ‘fast and slow’: ‘System 1
operates automatically and quickly, with little or no
effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates
attention to the effortful mental activities that demand
it, including complex computations … often associated
with the subjective experience of agency, choice and
concentration’.
For example, Lewis (2013, p 4, p 7) argues that ‘fast’ thinking is
‘typically where the action is’ because people tend to conserve
‘attention and cognitive processing capabilities for the few
activities we currently view as most essential’ and rely on
‘autopilot’ whenever emotions are heightened. He describes a list
of cognitive shortcuts, derived from psychology studies, that are
now a key feature of policy scholarship, including:
● the ‘availability heuristic’, when people relate the size,
frequency or probability of a problem to how easy it is to
remember or imagine;
● the ‘representativeness heuristic’, when people overestimate
the probability of vivid events;
● ‘prospect theory’, when ‘losses tend to pain us more than gains
please us’;
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● ‘framing effects’ based on emotional and moral judgements
over well thought out preferences;
● ‘conﬁrmation bias’, where material that corroborates what we
already believe is given disproportionate credence;
● ‘optimism bias’, or unrealistic expectations about our aims
working out well when we commit to them;
● ‘status quo bias’;
● a tendency to use exemplars of social groups to represent
general experience; and,
● a ‘need for coherence’ to establish gestalt like patterns and
causal relationships when they may not exist (2013, p 7).
There is always more to learn from contemporary psycholo-
gical studies which ‘zoom in’ to key aspects such as individual
and organisational psychology. For example, processing ﬂuency
(built on studies of the availability heuristic) suggests that indi-
viduals’ decisions are inﬂuenced by their familiarity with things;
and with the ease in which they process information (Alter and
Oppenheimer, 2009). They may pay more attention to an issue or
evidence if they already possess some knowledge of it and ﬁnd it
relatively easy to understand or recall (Alter and Oppenheimer,
2009, p 220). Other studies focus primarily on emotional heur-
istics (Brader, 2011; Haste, 2012), analyse the emotional con-
nection of individuals to the groups to which they identify
(Menges and Kilduff, 2015), or otherwise recognise that emotion
and cognition are part of the same internal mental process
(Storbeck and Clore, 2007).
Organisational psychology highlights the importance of ‘social
context’ and ‘group processes’, which often inhibit an organisa-
tion’s ability to ‘liberate’ the knowledge provided by each person
and broaden the ‘information considered before making a deci-
sion’ (Larrick, 2016). Obstacles include a tendency in established
groups to share, repeat, and trust ‘commonly held’ rather than
new information (‘common knowledge bias’), and to minimise
disagreement by limiting the diversity of information, which
disadvantages outsiders or ‘people in low positions of power who
withhold their private doubts because they fear a high social cost’
(2016, p 448).
Empirical studies are rarely conducted on policymakers
directly (Kwiatkowski, 2016), but the implications can be pro-
found. In particular, a policymaker may feel antagonism towards
a person giving what they perceive to be dubious evidence
without realising that is because they are ‘carrying’ a group
emotion with them (Menges and Kilduff, 2015). One’s lack of
awareness of the emotion does not preclude action (Schein, 1969).
For example, Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) point to
the need for collective social identiﬁcation, a sense of collective
self-efﬁcacy and the presence of emotion as predictors of coor-
dinated political action (such as protest). Kam (2005) found that
actors draw more from cues related to their allies (such as a
shared political party) than speciﬁc political issues. Houghton
(2008) points to many ‘errors’–from ‘decision making on impulse’
to ‘groupthink’–that the Bush administration made when going to
war in Iraq, and the Chilcot Inquiry (2016) makes similar points
about the UK Government under Blair. More generally, Bion
(1961) contrasts the positive idea of a work group, or group of
individuals able to have a good contact with reality and deal with
the anxiety engendered by complex tasks or difﬁcult relationships,
with a maladaptive group that seems to be in the thrall of
unspoken and unconscious ‘basic assumptions’ and fairly closed
to logical arguments.
The added value of policy studies is to show how such indi-
vidual and group behaviour plays out in complex policymaking
environments, containing:
1. A large number of inﬂuential actors spread across fragmen-
ted and multi-level political systems.
2. Institutions, as the rules and norms that actors use as
shortcuts to action.
3. The networks between policy makers and inﬂuencers, often
built on regular exchanges of information, trust, and a shared
outlook.
4. A tendency for well-established beliefs to monopolise the
ways in which actors understand policy problems.
5. The routine or unanticipated events to which policymakers
pay attention.
6. The socioeconomic context, to which policymakers need to
respond, even if most policy conditions (such as demo-
graphic and economic change) are difﬁcult to fully under-
stand or remain out of their control (Cairney and Heikkila,
2014; Cairney and Weible, 2017).
In other words, modern policy theories take us beyond simple
notions of linear policymaking via a series of stages in a policy
cycle, in which: a small elite group of policymakers are in control
of the policy process; they are aided by expert policy analysts to
make and legitimise choices; skilful public servants carry them
out; and, policy analysts assess the results using evidence (Cair-
ney, 2015; 2016). Instead, there are many powerful but boundedly
rational actors in play. Individual policymakers, or a collection of
elite policymakers at the ‘macropolitical’ level, can only ‘serial
process’, or focus on one issue at a time; governments as a whole
can ‘parallel process’ because there are many policymakers spread
across many organisations working on different issues (Baum-
gartner and Jones, 1993, p 7). In such a complex system, where no
single policymaker is in charge, and policy outcomes seem to
emerge without singular central direction: ‘the most relevant
evidence adopters will be operating at multiple levels of govern-
ment, stages will appear to interact in a disorderly way, and policy
will be made as it is carried out, by bodies that may not report
directly to central government’ (Cairney, 2016, p 41; Cairney,
2012b).
Early post-war studies focused on the goal-oriented strategies
of key actors in that context (Jones, 2017). Simon (1957; 1976, p
28) identiﬁed policymakers’ ‘rules of thumb’ to identify the issues
most important to them and gather the most relevant informa-
tion to produce ‘good enough’ decisions. For Lindblom (1959, p
88; 1964, p 157) ‘incrementalism’ described key rules to deal with
bounded rationality: identify realistic policy aims that do not
divert radically from the status quo, limit analysis to those
options, and combine analysis with strategies such as trial-and-
error. Their enduring insight is that bounded rationality is an
ever-present constraint on policymakers, who are ‘under con-
tinual pressure to reach decisions’ (Botterill and Hindmoor, 2012,
p 369). Although information technologies have improved, they
do not preclude the need to make judgements quickly about ‘what
is feasible’ in the face of limits to ‘brain power, time and ﬁnancial
inputs’ (2012, p 369).
Modern theories show that ‘incremental’ change may result less
from strategic trial and error and more from unequal power; the
exercise of power to entrench fast choices. Policymakers respond
to bounded rationality by relying on quick gut-level, instinctual,
emotional, and moral choices. Put most strongly, ‘Reason is
emotion’s slave and exists to rationalize experience’ (Bion, 1970)
when unconscious processes, out of awareness, are present
(Arnaud, 2012). ‘Hot cognition’ (Lodge and Taber, 2005, p 456)
describes actors’ feelings about things they have thought about in
the past – ‘political leaders, groups, issues, symbols, and ideas’ –
which come ‘automatically and inescapably to mind’ and ‘become
information’. If so, people become ‘biased reasoners … even
when they are motivated to be impartial’. Passion and intuition
helps explain why policymakers quickly assign praise and blame
to ‘target populations’ and their beliefs often seem impervious to
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change (Schneider et al., 2014; Lewis, 2013, p 13; Fiske 2011).
Policy actors may deal collectively with bounded rationality by
telling simple stories to help ‘process information, communicate,
and reason’ (McBeth et al., 2014) and an ‘evidence-gathering’
process may serve to reinforce collective identity or what people
already believe (Lewis, 2013, p 13–15; Stone, 1989). Or, powerful
‘advocacy coalitions’ can obstruct policy change for decades
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). They consist of actors who enter
politics to turn their beliefs into policy, form coalitions with
people who share their beliefs, romanticise their own cause and
demonise their opponents (Sabatier et al., 1987, p 451; Buck-
ingham, 2011), and interpret the same evidence in wildly different
ways (Weible, 2007, p 99).
However, bounded rationality can also prompt major policy
change. Individuals typically pay attention to one policy problem
and a particular way to frame it (the ‘policy image’) at a time.
They often take certain ways of thinking for granted for long
periods, often because they are not paying attention (Baumgart-
ner and Jones, 1993, p 7; Baumgartner, 2017; Cairney, 2012a, p
230; Hall, 1993). Yet, policy problems are ambiguous, people can
entertain multiple policy images (Zahariadis, 2014), and a small
change in policy conditions, or injection of new information, can
produce a major shift of attention to a policy problem or different
image (Baumgartner et al., 2014). Bounded rationality plus
ambiguity produces the potential for ‘macro-political’ attention to
lurch dramatically and create the conditions for change (True
et al., 2007, pp 158–159). During such ‘windows of opportunity’,
actors can exploit widespread but temporary surges of attention
to a problem to promote their favoured solution (Kingdon, 1984;
Zahariadis, 2014; Cairney and Jones, 2016).
Use this knowledge to produce a three-step communication
strategy
We can choose to describe such informational shortcuts nega-
tively or positively. For example, it is common for studies of
‘evidence based policymaking’ to bemoan the cognitive biases of
policymakers and seek ways to limit individual discretion (Cair-
ney, 2016, p 123; Parkhurst, 2016). Yet, how could elected pol-
icymakers possibly understand all of the things for which they are
responsible, or produce a coherent and orderly policy process
when so many actors, institutions, networks, ideas, events, and
socioeconomic conditions are in play?
Gigerenzer (2001, pp 37–38) makes a more positive case for
human cognition under such complex conditions, describing
heuristics as the ‘computationally cheap’ methods people use to
make choices, as part of an ‘adaptive toolbox’. He argues that we
should understand ‘how actual humans …make decisions, as
opposed to heavenly beings being equipped with practically
unlimited time, knowledge, memory, and other unlimited
resources’. In other words, examine how people use ‘fast and
frugal’ heuristics and emotions to limit choice. These tools allow
people to experiment using trial and error, use emotions to limit
needless searches for new choices (such as considering the costs/
beneﬁts of keeping one’s children), and make choices based on a
small number of simple rules rather than trying in vain to weigh
all costs and beneﬁts (see also Frank, 1988). It is not necessary to
marvel at policymaker heuristics, but a less negative interpreta-
tion allows us to think about how to respond positively.
Step 1. Understand your audience and tailor your response
The ﬁrst step is to consider ‘cognitive biases’ from the perspective
of policymakers instead of bemoaning them from our own: while
we may think they take policymaking ‘off course’, they envisage a
bias in a road which allows them to travel smoothly and safely
around a sharp bend. Policymakers have to make decisions
quickly, often based on their values and judgements reﬂecting
their beliefs. New data triggers schemata in the brain that ‘ﬁlter
out’ the need to pay complete attention, by, for example, recog-
nising a familiar array of circumstances. This process of skilled
high-level pattern recognition may override what we consider to
be an impetus to act differently when new facts arise.
On that basis, we can tailor responses with reference to ﬂuency,
conscious action, emotional decision-making, and evolutionary
psychology. First, from studies of processing ﬂuency we already
know to avoid overly complicated presentations of evidence with
numerous subclauses, technical diagrams, caveats, nuances, and
academically fashionable jargon. Studies of learning (Winne and
Nesbit, 2010) suggest: minimising cognitive load and the amount
of material to be stored in temporary short term memory;
creating conditions for transfer to long term memory; using
multiple coding (such as words and pictures); presenting mate-
rials more than once; maintaining coherence of the message;
minimising the irrelevant; telling stories and giving speciﬁc
examples; asking for feedback; providing time for processing and
reﬂection; and attending to energy and fatigue levels.
We could also consider factors such as primacy and recency, in
which material presented at the beginning or at the end of a
presentation is more likely to be recalled, and the Von Rostroff
effect, in which something unusual becomes more memorable.
Studies also point to strategies such as the manipulation of fonts,
colours, and duration of texts and images, the repeated use of text
or images, or the simpliﬁcation of messages, or provision of
priming messages, to inﬂuence their recall and ease of informa-
tion processing; and the provision of fewer choices to aid decision
making (Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009, p 227). Communication
can also grab the attention using focusing events (Birkland, 1997),
linking evidence to something immediate that affects them - or
their voters or party–and generating a sense of proximity to an
issue that can be perceived in concrete, not abstract, terms (Alter
and Oppenheimer, 2008, p 166).
Second, policymakers who use deliberate tactics consciously
may need to be consciously inﬂuenced. For example, to reﬂect
Simon and Lindblom’s insights, actors need to identify the visible
goals expressed explicitly by policymakers, and the less visible
‘rules of thumb’ they use to deal with bounded rationality and
make ‘good enough’ decisions quickly.
Third, it is less obvious how to adapt to, or try to inﬂuence,
people motivated by social intuition, values or moral judgement,
and we need more evidence on the success of speciﬁc adaptation
strategies. However, studies of ‘framing’ provide a starting point.
In policy studies, ‘framing’ or ‘problem deﬁnition’ refers to the
ways in which we encourage our audience to understand, portray,
and categorise issues. Problems are multi-faceted, but bounded
rationality limits the attention of policymakers, and actors com-
pete to highlight one image at the expense of others. The outcome
of this competition determines who is involved, who has relevant
expertise, who is responsible for policy, how much attention they
pay, and what kind of solution they favour (Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993; Dearing and Rogers, 1996).
In that context, we should adapt framing strategies speciﬁcally
to the cognitive biases we think are at play (Cairney et al., 2016, p
3). If policymakers are combining cognitive and emotive pro-
cesses, combine facts with emotional appeals (True et al., 2007, p
161). If policymakers are reﬂecting a group emotion, frame new
evidence to be consistent with the ‘lens’ through which actors in
those groups or coalitions understand the world (Weible et al.,
2012). If policymakers are making quick choices based on their
values and moral judgements, tell simple stories with a hero and a
clear moral (see the articles on storytelling in the Palgrave
Communications series, by Davidson, 2017 and Jones and Crow
2017).
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Finally, a fundamental aspect of evolutionary psychology is
that people need to get on with each other, so showing simple
respect – and ‘mirroring’ - can be useful even if it looks facile.
Indeed, there is good evidence to show that stepping into
someone else’s shoes allows you to more fully appreciate their
world from their position (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006).
Step 2. Identify ‘windows of opportunity’
Timing matters, but it can refer to two very different processes.
In psychology, timing can refer to the often-limited chance to
inﬂuence individuals. An emotional reaction may take place
before any conscious processing, and the person may not be
aware that their decision is not made purely on logical grounds.
For example, clear thinking is difﬁcult during extended heigh-
tened emotion (say, during an important event). Anyone seek-
ing to inﬂuence policymakers at such times should note that it
is unlikely that peripheral information will be attended to or
remembered, since it may not even enter ‘working memory’
(Baddeley, 2012). What is seen as crucially important may
absorb all the processing capacity of an individual; if that
individual is under stress and the arousal lasts a long time the
effect may be pronounced. However, under some conditions of
heightened arousal, memory may not function the way you
expect. For instance, ‘ﬂashbulb memory’ may occur for parti-
cular events, and people may remember peripheral or irrelevant
material extremely vividly (as in the triggering cues for post-
traumatic stress disorder).
It is possible to ﬁnd the right time to inﬂuence emotional
thinking while, for example, telling vivid stories to arouse the
emotional interest of your audience. However the emotional
content of the communication can have a perverse effect. For
example, health psychology studies ﬁnd that, under certain con-
ditions, if the suggested outcome–such as terror at dying of cancer
as a result of smoking–is portrayed too vividly, or is too frigh-
tening, people may ‘switch off’, exhibiting defensive reactions
rather than attend to the message (Witte & Allen, 2000). There
seems to be a U shaped curve of attention when it comes to the
vividness of emotional messaging (Dillard et al., 2016).
It may be more effective to provoke positive emotions by set-
ting a positive ‘emotional tone’ using, for example Cialdini’s
(1983) notion of social proof to indicate how many other mem-
bers of a favoured social group share a particular position.
However, someone’s pre-existing emotional attachment or alle-
giance to a group or coalition may rapidly override any positive
feelings they have towards you or your position. In other words, it
is useful to bear in mind the broader system within which this
human being is embedded. Foulkes and Anthony (1957) describe
people being nodes in an emotional net; as part of the net is
tugged the node or knot moves. You may cause some slight
movement but remember the existing interconnections to others
may be much more powerful than your tug. In short, storytelling
matters, but your evidence-based story may compete with the
stories that people tell themselves about themselves and their
place in the world (Tuckett and Nikolic, 2017).
In policy studies, timing refers to the dynamics of policy
environments. For example, multiple streams analysis describes
the conditions under which there is a ‘window of opportunity’ for
policy change: attention to a policy problem rises; a feasible
solution exists; and, policymakers have the motive and oppor-
tunity to select it (Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 2014; Cairney and
Jones, 2016). So, framing problems is an important exercise,
but lurches of attention to one way of understanding a problem
won’t produce policy change unless a solution has become
acceptable to the wider policy network and policymakers identify
the right time to act.
Kingdon (1984, p 21, p 104) describes ‘policy entrepreneurs’
who use their knowledge of this process to further their own
policy ends. They ‘lie in wait in and around government with
their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to ﬂoat by to which
they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the
political stream they can use to their advantage’ (Kingdon, 1984,
p 165–166; Cairney, 2012a, pp 271–272). Note the primacy of
environmental conditions in this metaphor: entrepreneurs are
‘surfers waiting for the big wave’ (Kingdon, 1984, p 173), not
‘Poseidon-like masters of the seas’ (Cairney and Jones, 2016, p
41). Their effectiveness comes from an investment of resources to
generate knowledge of the political system and its ‘rules of the
game’, build up trust in the information they provide, and form
coalitions, all of which helps them know when to act decisively
when the time is right.
Step 3. Engage with real world policymaking rather than
waiting for a ‘rational’ and orderly process to appear
If the policy process does not resemble a policy cycle in which we
know to whom and when to provide evidence, we need more
intelligent strategies to engage with real world policymaking. It is
tempting to argue that policymaking should change to encourage
more use of scientiﬁc evidence (Parkhurst, 2016), but we can also
be pragmatic enough to adapt our own strategies while we wait
for it to happen (or expect it never to happen, Cairney, 2016).
We can infer from the organisational psychology literature that
this wait will be long. For example, the study of leadership in
organisations is vast and inconclusive (Avolio et al. 2009; Lewis &
Donaldson-Feilder, 2012). It often produces vague ‘how to do it
better’ advice from which we can infer that organisations are not
already doing well (Bedi & Schat, 2013; Ferris, 2005; Ferris et al.,
2007; Kapoutsis, Papalexandris, Nikolopoulos, Hochwarter, &
Ferris, 2011; Prati, Perrewe, & Ferris, 2009). ‘State of the art’
studies have, for decades, recommended major changes to rules
and behaviour rather than reported their actual occurrence.
For example, Larrick (2016, p 461) identiﬁes ways to encourage
greater diversity of perspectives in group decision-making by
fostering trust, collectivism, and an assurance that less powerful
or more peripheral actors are not punished for presenting
information that challenges existing ways of thinking. One
solution is ‘task conﬂict’ rather than ‘relationship conﬂict’, to
encourage information sharing without major repercussions. It
requires the trust and ‘psychological safety’ that comes with ‘team
development’ (2016, p 448). If successful, one can ‘speak truth to
power’ (Wildavsky, 1980) or be conﬁdent that your presentation
of evidence, which challenges the status quo, is received posi-
tively. Under such circumstances, a ‘battle of ideas’ can genuinely
take place and new thinking can be possible.
If these circumstances are not present, speaking truth to power
may be disastrous. Politicians may be conﬁdent of policy and
have an impressive grasp of facts and details, but be only adequate
in organisational politics, or unable to change the rules of their
organisations (Kwiatkowski, 2011). Or, while they necessarily
appear highly conﬁdent, they are actually vulnerable, anxious,
and defensive, and perhaps closed to challenging or discordant
information.
Consequently, our aim is to give advice to actors who need to
adapt to current organisational reality even if they hope they can
help change it in the long run. In the absence of Larrick’s sug-
gested reforms, actors need different strategies, such as: form
relationships in networks, coalitions, or organisations ﬁrst, then
supply challenging information second. To challenge without
establishing trust may be very counterproductive, and lead to
outright premature rejection; and, once a public position has been
taken, it is particularly difﬁcult for policy to be reversed.
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Such general advice is already common in policy studies as part
of a package of possible measures: ‘learn and follow the “rules of
the game” [of policy networks] to improve strategies and help
build up trust; form coalitions with actors with similar aims and
beliefs; and frame the evidence to appeal to the biases, beliefs, and
priorities of policy makers’ (Cairney et al., 2016; see also Weible
et al., 2012; Stoker 2010, pp 55–57). From organisational psy-
chology, we may develop further analysis of how to identify
chances to form networks with, or inﬂuence, policymakers, such
as being at the right place at the right time and having inﬂuential
mentors (Kwiatkowski, 2011). This knowledge may help practi-
tioners to spot the difference between:
1. people in organisations who have limited power, have been
asked to ﬁll in time for others, and/ or will not spend what
little political capital they possess in championing your
position
2. the more astute, who will have identiﬁed your issue as an
upcoming problem, an area where they can demonstrate
thought leadership, become the acknowledged expert, or even
save the group from a terrible decision.
With the latter, you are pushing at an open door but you may
need to put aside your own ego and allow them to take over and
express your ideas. You may even want to write parts of their
speeches for them, provide them with brieﬁngs, and (if you are
lucky) allow them to have the kudos of having an expert on tap.
Here you are putting yourself in the role of a ‘follower’, in the
hope that leaders will remember and reward you. In other words,
leader member exchange theory would suggest that some reci-
procity would be expected on both sides (Kwiatkowski, 2011). Of
course it is risky to ally yourself with one side, but somewhat
riskier to think of yourself, naïvely, as above organisational pol-
itics. The more you are aware of internal political groupings in the
institution you are seeking to inﬂuence the better. At the very
least, by attending to the signals from speciﬁc groups you can
make sure that you are positioning your message appropriately.
Conclusion
To engage effectively in policymaking, we need to understand
that it is not populated by a small number of elite, ‘rational’ actors
making policy in a series of linear stages. Rather, human psy-
chology and political systems come together to create a dynamic
policy process characterised by many actors combining cognition
and emotion while competing to inﬂuence continuous policy
choice. The role of evidence is not always clear. However, the
policy literature emphasises its use more than its production, by
actors who anticipate or respond to lurches of attention, moral
choices, and coalitions built on bolstering one’s own position,
demonising competitors, and discrediting some evidence. Such
analysis provides a useful corrective to the fantasy of a logical,
understandable, controlled, linear policy process in which evi-
dence can be directed to a single moment of authoritative and
‘comprehensively rational’ choice.
These insights help us develop three profoundly important
lessons. First, use psychological insights to ‘know your audience’.
People combine cognitive and emotional short cuts to thought
and action, and they often do so without fully understanding the
underlying reasons for their action. So, presenting a concise
evidential synthesis to minimise cognitive burden is more effec-
tive than bombarding them with more information than they are
willing and able to process. Further, telling stories, or using other
framing techniques that more readily allow information to enter
the memory, is more effective than presenting evidence as if it can
speak for itself. Evidence advocacy is ineffective if focusing purely
on logic, ‘establishing the facts’, or describing complexity in an
overly complicated way, rather than building on the ways in
which people simplify their world. Framing and storytelling helps
policymakers understand why they should pay attention to a
problem, and prompts them to demand more evidence to help
solve it.
Second, understand the role of timing. It is possible to ﬁnd the
right time to inﬂuence thinking by telling stories to arouse the
emotional interest of your audience, but clear thinking is difﬁcult
during extended heightened emotion; the emotional content of
the communication can have unintended consequences, and it
may be more effective to set a positive emotional tone with
reference to the beliefs of an individual’s favoured social group. In
policymaking systems, timing relates more to the conﬂuence of
events and choices: attention rises to a problem, a solution is
available, and key actors have the motive and opportunity to
select it.
Third, do not wait for a ‘rational’ and orderly process to
appear. To try to present evidence during mythical stages of a
‘policy cycle’ is misguided, and to ‘speak truth to power’ without
establishing trust is counterproductive. To understand the
dynamics of policymaking organisations and systems requires
major investment. Policymaking takes place in an environment
with many policymakers, many authoritative organisations,
venues, or networks with their own rules that take time to
understand, and in which there is often a dominant way to
understand policy problems. So, evidence may have little
impact unless we work out which coalitions hold inﬂuence, how
their members understand the world, where and with whom to
engage, how to form effective alliances, and how to spot the right
time to act.
Of course, there remain ethical questions about how far we
should take this advice (Cairney and Oliver, 2017; Smith and
Stewart, 2017; Cairney and Weible, 2017). It may look like we
recommend a shift from ‘honest broker’ to ‘issue advocate’, which
often seems counter to a scientiﬁc identity (Pielke, 2007). Rather,
most of our advice is simply to promote clearer communication
based on knowing your audience and the environment in which
they operate. We can only make a careful judgement about going
further if we clarify the strategies available to us, and reﬂect on
our reasons for action in relation to our own ethical and moral
positions.
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Notes
1 Indeed, we have to make our recommendations while facing our own cognitive and
evidential limits. At best, much of this psychological research is nascent, producing a
limited evidence base that is difﬁcult to replicate in messy, multivariate and complex
real-world political contexts. Further, within psychology, the idea of the ‘normal’
human being does not command widespread support, so all generalisations about the
underpinnings of patterns of cognition should always be treated with caution. Policy
scholars have used psychological insights to inform theories effectively, but in a
speculative or deductive way not anticipated by the original architects of psychological
research. In most cases, the original research informs one aspect of a new problem
without giving us much indication about what to do, and at times it does little to
inform ethical discussions about how we should act, since many psychologists are
interested in understanding what is rather than speculating on what should be. So, this
article and its recommendations represent ‘the psychological politics of evidence-based
policymaking’ in a nutshell: policymakers face uncertainty and have to draw on limited
evidence, and make value judgements, to produce necessarily problematic but ‘good
enough’ decisions. If we seek to inﬂuence that process we may need to do the same,
even if our potentially successful strategies are not as ‘evidence based’ as we would like.
If we embrace this need to act pragmatically and humbly, despite high uncertainty,
‘psychology based policy studies’ will become a central component of any policy
‘impact’ initiative.
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